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Abstract
Why do we observe some LDCs objecting the prospect of a Multilat-
eral Agreement on Investment (MAI), although they have been keen to
liberalize investment in preferential agreements in recent years? In this
paper, we analyse the issue of MAI implementation and assess the welfare
consequences of such kind of agreements. In our model, participation to
MAI involves a trade-o¤ between less rent extraction from multinational
…rms (MNEs) and more abundant FDI in‡ows. At equilibrium, either all
countries enter MAI, or all countries stay out, or only some of them enter.
Coordination problems may induce multiple equilibria: the three types
of equilibria may coexist. So, the implementation of MAI may depend
not only on structural factors but also on the general ”political climate”.
When all countries join MAI, world welfare is maximized because this
minimizes the hold-up problem faced by MNEs and stimulates invest-
ment. However, in an asymmetric world, welfare gains are not guaranteed
for all countries.
JEL Reference: F13, F23., O19.
Keywords: Foreign Direct Investment, International Agreements, In-
complete Contracts, Adverse selection, Multiple Equilibria.
¤University of Bergamo and CEPR. Department of Economics, University of Bergamo,
P.zza Rosate 2, 24100 Bergamo, Italy. Ph: +39-35-277506; Fax: +39-35-249975. E-mail:
turrini@core.ucl.ac.be.
yCentro Studi Luca D’ Agliano, Milan, and HWWA, Hamburg. LdA, Bocconi Univer-
sity, Via Sarfatti 25, 20136 Milano. Tel. +39-02-58365347; Fax. +39-02-58363399. E-mail:
dieter.urban@uni-bocconi.it.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
What is the economic rationale for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment
(MAI)?1 Why do we observe some Least Developed Countries (LDCs) objecting
strongly the prospect of MAI, even though they are not forced to join? What
are the likely consequences of MAI on world welfare? How will the possible gains
be divided? The aim of this paper is that of o¤ering a theoretical framework
for MAI in which the above questions can …nd an answer.
In the past decades, multilateralism has substantially contributed to main-
tain a free trade climate in a world with wide economic, social, and political
di¤erences. As trade integration deepens the need for a multilateral approach
extends from manufacture trade to new issues such as trade in services, intel-
lectual property rights, or right of establishment. The growing importance of
FDI and FDI-related trade issues has led the OECD to propose in 1995 a draft
for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment, directed to OECD and non-OECD
member countries, with the aim of fostering FDI liberalization and protecting
investment on a multilateral basis, under the working of a dispute settlement
procedure di¤erent from that of the WTO. Negotiations on the OECD MAI
draft stopped in 1998. Since then, the desirability and the feasibility of a mul-
tilateral investment agreement is under study by a WTO working group.
The MAI proposal has been strongly debated world-wide, receiving criticism
by several interest and opinion groups within advanced countries (NGOs, en-
vironmentalists, trade unions) and a …erce opposition by some LDCs. This is
somewhat puzzling. In fact, the countries that do not agree with the conditions
of a proposed MAI are perfectly free to opt out. So, why was there such a
strong opposition to the simple eventuality that some nations could join this
agreement? Second, the negative reactions to MAI deeply contrast with the
growing positive attitude towards FDIs that is spreading especially in the de-
veloping world. Almost all LDCs have recently adopted measures that are more
favorable to FDIs, not less.2 Finally, the opposition to MAI clashes with the
proliferation of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and regional agreements
on foreign direct investments that aim at protecting and liberalizing FDI in
member countries.3
In this paper we present a model to study international investment agree-
ments in which the above puzzle can …nd an explanation. We develop a frame-
work of analysis in which the desirability of MAI has a sound economic justi…-
cation, but in which it is also possible to provide an explanation of the observed
di¢culties in its implementation.
Our paper is only loosely related with the existing literature on the e¤ects of
FDI policies and on subsidy competition among countries to attract investments
(see, e.g., Bond and Samuelson (1986), Black and Hoyt (1989), Fumagalli (1998),
1Throughout the paper, the acronym MAI is used generically with reference to any Mul-
tilateral Investment Agreement.
2For example, see UNCTAD (1998) for a review of FDI policies across the world.
3Consider, for instance, the recent initiatives by Asean and Mercosur (UNCTAD (1998)).
2Haaparanta (1996), Haaland and Wooton (1999), Hau‡er and Wooton (1999)).
In our model, the focus is on the externalities that are inherent to international
FDI agreements, on problems of implementation, and on welfare.4
To build a model, we need …rst to isolate the basic ingredients of the proposed
investment agreements, and to identify their economic implications. When en-
tering MAI, countries commit to limit their own freedom of action vis-à-vis
MNEs. As already suggested in Markusen (1998), this commitment translates
into a reduction in countries’ bargaining power that might have real e¤ects. If
investments are speci…c to the particular …rm-country match and investment
cannot be contracted ex-ante, then MNEs are likely to underinvest due to a
hold-up problem. By reducing countries’ freedom of action, MAI has the desir-
able e¤ect of reducing the extent of the hold-up problem and the corresponding
ine¢ciency. This is the basic rational behind the desirability of MAI imple-
mentation. What is at stake is not only the distribution of FDI rents between
MNEs and host countries. Rather, the economic rational for MAI is that of
fostering investment world-wide through improved transparency and discipline
on governments’ attitude towards MNEs.
Second, we need a model where the distributive implications of MAI are con-
sistent with stylized facts. Here, we note that multilateral investment agreements
cannot really be assimilated to trade agreements. While multilateral liberaliza-
tion is likely to produce gains for all countries – due, primarily, to the exploita-
tion of comparative advantages and scale economies – this is not necessarily the
case for investment agreements. Among the hard-core stylized facts about FDIs,
we know (see, e.g., Markusen (1995)) that foreign direct investments are found
in sectors where …rms’ intangible assets are important and that FDIs normally
originate from countries with abundant “knowledge capital”. The economic ac-
tors (managers, workers, scientists,...) that embody the knowledge capital key
to MNEs are unequally distributed across the world, are relatively immobile in-
ternationally, and, in general, cannot be acquired overnight. This explains the
very unequal distribution of FDIs across the world, and its persistency. In this
framework, we expect two possible gainers from MAI: MNEs in general, which
will …nd a more favorable environment for their operations, and those host coun-
tries that are able to attract more FDIs, which will bene…t from FDI-generated
positive spillovers. Some country, however, may not receive more FDI in‡ows
after MAI. Equally, some country may not bene…t from boosted own MNEs’
pro…ts. We also note that MAI, as compared with trade agreements, is likely
to produce more substantial externalities. When some countries agree on a set
of rules to liberalize and protect investments of foreign origin, they are likely
to divert FDI ‡ows from the countries that remain outside of the agreement.
This, in turn, alters the cost-bene…t comparisons concerning MAI on the part
of outsiders.
4The focus of our paper is analogous, for instance, to that of Baldwin (1995). There, the
externalities associated with the formation of common markets are anlysed. The fact that a
group of countries enters this type of agreement may a¤ect the willingness of the others to do
the same, i.e., may produce a “domino e¤ect”.
3The …nal ingredient of our model is a mechanism through which countries
self-select between MAI members and MAI outsiders. The gain from MAI mem-
bership is associated with larger FDI in‡ows. This could be o¤set, however, by
the loss of freedom and the bargaining power that the countries undergo when
joining MAI. When countries are heterogenous in their institutions, laws, or
h a b i t s ,w e… n dt h a tt h ec o u n t r i e st h a ta r em o r ek e e nt oj o i nM A Ia r et h o s ew i t h
higher bargaining power: for them, the loss of freedom due to MAI membership
has a relatively low weight.
In order to capture relevant e¤ects, we must develop a model where countries
are many, where …rms make pro…ts, and where MNEs and countries (govern-
ments) interact in a rather complex way. The level of investment undertaken by
MNEs in the di¤erent countries, the partition of countries in MAI-members and
outsiders, and the direction of FDI ‡ows must all be determined endogenously
in equilibrium. As will be clear, we have to economize on the analysis by making
quite radical simpli…cations, basically a highly symmetric world without di¤er-
ences in factor endowments across countries and equal production techniques.
The model set-up borrows from Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) the use of a
dual-technology production representation. As Grossman and Helpman (1999),
we also resort to a world with incomplete contracting.
We analyze how the size of MAI depends on the strictness of its rules, e.g., on
the loss of discretion (bargaining power) that countries have to accept by joining
MAI. We …nd that, depending on the degree of severity of the discipline imposed
by MAI, equilibrium may either exhibit no MAI participants, or all countries
entering MAI, or only some countries as members. Roughly, we observe the
equilibrium size of MAI rising, and then falling as MAI becomes stricter. It is
to note, however, that coordination problems might be particularly strong. In
some cases, the three types of equilibria may coexist. So, the implementation
of MAI may depend in some circumstances not only on structural factors, but
also on expectations and the general “political climate”. Finally, we …nd that,
in spite of the desirability of MAI from a world viewpoint, the countries that
are not endowed with su¢cient MNEs’ holdings may end up losing from MAI.
A country owning no MNEs can hope to gain from the implementation of MAI
only when MAI does not reach full participation, thanks to larger FDI in‡ows.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we
summarize stylized facts of international investment agreements and outline the
main features of the economics of MAI. In section 3, we develope the set-up
of our model. Section 4 is devoted to the equilibrium analysis, while section 5
focuses on the welfare properties of MAI. In section 6, we discuss our results.
Concluding comments are found in section 7.
42W h a t i s M A I ?
2.1 Stylized Facts
The negotiations for a multilateral agreement on investment were launched in
1995 among the twenty-nine member states of the OECD and stopped in 1998,
without success. Since then, the task of exploring the desirability and the fea-
sibility of a multilateral investment agreement has been deferred to a WTO
working group.
The core rules of any possible MAI draft are similar to those of existing bi-
lateral or regional investment agreements. What really distinguishes MAI with
respect to other existing investment treaties is that the agreement is not pref-
erential. To be consistent with multilateralism, the agreement must be open to
all the countries that are willing to obey its rules. So, compared with bilateral
or regional agreements, all countries are potential members. International in-
vestment agreements are characterized by four basic elements: the de…nition of
the investments covered by the agreement, the rules aimed at protecting invest-
ment, those directed at investment liberalization, and a set of rules de…ning a
dispute settlement mechanism. Foreign investment may either be de…ned in a
narrow (e.g. FDI in manufacturing) or in a broad sense (FDI in all sectors and
activities and portfolio investment). Concerning the rules aimed at providing
investment protection, they basically consist of provisions against expropriation
and to guarantee free transfer of funds. The rules that are directed at fostering
investment liberalization may act both ex-ante (right of establishment) and ex-
post (guarantees against performance requirements) and should be applied in a
non-discriminatory way. Finally, concerning the dispute settlement mechanism
(DSP), it may work only on a State-State basis, or also on a Investor-to-state
basis. The OECD MAI proposal contemplated investment de…ned in a broad
sense (all FDIs plus portfolio investment), non discrimination consistent with
the MFN and national treatment principles, and a DSP working both on a
State-State basis and on an Investor-State basis.
The rules concerning the principle of non-discrimination, the de…nition of
expropriation, and the working of the DSP are among the most disputed. Non-
discrimination is not surprisingly a sensitive issue: it corresponds to a loss of
policy tools used by governments to deter or attract di¤erent types of invest-
ments. As for expropriation, there are controversies around its de…nition. In-
vestors might feel expropriated whenever a so-called ”regulatory taking” occurs,
i.e., whenever a government action reduces the value of their assets. However,
some takings may correspond to outright expropriation (con…scation, national-
ization...), while others may be justi…ed on the ground of health, safety, envi-
ronmental or social concerns. Regarding the working of the DSP, the Investor-
State arbitration is often criticized. Since this way MNEs can directly sue
governments, the fear is that MNEs may use the DSP as a device to discourage
governments from introducing legitimate regulations. Because the concepts of
expropriation and non-discrimination are subtle, MNEs may have an incentive
to contest any government action that is felt as detrimental. Governments,
5fearing costly law-suits, may be induced in some circumstances to abstain from
introducing or enforcing regulations even when they serve a social goal as the
correction of externalities.5
The failure of the OECD MAI negotiations has been attributed, separately,
to two set of causes.6 O no n es i d et h e r ea r ei s s u e sr e l a t e dt ot h ed e s i g no ft h e
agreement. The MAI draft has been considered quite demanding for partici-
pating countries: the rules were rather “strict” compared with those of existing
international investment treaties. On the other side, there is an unfavorable
general political climate. In particular, a rising role of NGOs in the interna-
tional scene and a deepening divide between developed and developing countries
on multilateral issues have been felt as working against the success of the nego-
tiations.
2.2 Towards the Economics of MAI
The stake of countries in international agreements on foreign direct investment
has been discussed in recent literature. In WTO (1996) and Drabek (1998) are
summarized a series of “institutional” arguments that may motivate countries,
especially LDCs, to object a multilateral investment agreement. First, there are
fears of loss of political control and consensus. By joining MAI, governments
lose power of action on MNEs, thus partly losing control on the economy. FDI
may also break up the social balance among di¤erent social groups and induce
a political change.7. Furthermore, uncontrolled FDI in‡ows may entail a polit-
ically costly process of adjustment associated with the replacement of domestic
by foreign production or with the enforcement of a change in budgetary practises
of governments.8 Second, countries may object MAI for the fear of increased
economic insecurity and inequality. For instance, there may be an increased risk
of capital ‡ight (see, e.g., UNCTAD, 1996 and 1997, and Rodrik, 1997).
Markusen (1998) proposes an approach to the economic analysis of the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of MAI-membership for LDCs.9 The basic trade-o¤
involved is that of rules versus discretion. By joining MAI, countries can cred-
ibly “tie their hands”, giving up some policy tools. There are advantages from
that. Adhering to strict rules may attract FDIs and foster investment due to
higher transparency, reduced transaction costs for MNEs and reduced political
risk. The loss of discretion entails also evident costs: reduced bargaining power
and the loss of discriminatory policy instruments.
Several theoretical arguments and abundant empirical evidence support the
thesis that MNEs, when transferring knowledge capital, create positive spillovers
5Examples of possible misuse of the DSP by MNEs are reported within NAFTA, that has
rules on investment similar to that of MAI (UNCTAD, 1998, p. 61).
6See, for instance, UNCTAD (1999).
7The experience of Indonesia during the Asian crises may serve as a recent example of
political instability in the presence of free capital ‡ows.
8See also Rodrik (1997) on this point.
9See also Hoekman and Saggi (1999) for an analysis of the economic trade-o¤ faced by
LDCs in participating into multilateral investment agreements.
6in host countries (see, e.g., Blomstrom (1989)). It follows that any provision that
is likely to attract FDIs (like improved transparency of investment procedures
and reduced risk of expropriation) is possibly bene…cial to host countries. The
loss of discretion has also costs for host countries. The loss of bargaining power
and freedom of action will probably correspond to a smaller gain that the host
countries can derive from a given stock of FDI (foregone tax revenue, unregu-
lated negative externalities,...). The loss of discriminatory policy tools to handle
MNEs di¤erently is also costly. Some MNEs may create positive spillovers and
bene…t local production factors. Others may instead be largely polluting and
unwilling to invest in the skills of the local workforce. If MAI forbids treating
these cases di¤erently, some MNEs will be deterred unnecessarily, and others
will obtain a free lunch. In general, if MAI does not really contribute much in
fostering investment and attracting FDI, the negative e¤ect of MAI associated
with reduced discretion and bargaining power may prevail.
The concern of this paper is especially with the position of LDCs. Some of
them have been vigorously against the OECD negotiations (Drabek, 1998).10
The position taken by these LDCs during the OECD negotiations of MAI is at
odds with some facts.
First, most countries, especially LDCs, seem to consider that the political
costs associated with uncontrolled FDI in‡ows are largely outweighed by eco-
nomic gains. In the last couple of decades, countries started to be keen on
liberalizing investment. This is understood, for instance, by looking at the dis-
tribution of new policy measures towards FDI. During the nineties almost all
countries shifted to more liberal policies (Table 1).
Regulatory changes 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
More favorable to FDI 79 101 108 106 98 135 136
Less favorable to FDI :: 1 2 61 6 1 69
Table 1 : National Regulatory Changes, 1992-97
(Source, UNCTAD 1999, table IV.1, p. 115.)
Second, the objections to MAI are also hardly justi…ed by the loss of discretion.
Countries, in general, do not seem to escape from international commitments
on FDI. We observe instead a recent surge of Bilateral Investment Treaties
(BITs), regional arrangements on international investment, and Double Taxa-
tion Treaties (DTTs).11 While until the sixties there were no BITs in place, the
number of BITs has risen to 1513 in 1997 and has been growing throughout all
the nineties (see UNCTAD, 1998).
10In particular, India, Indonesia, and Malaysia were critical. The vigour with which the
representatives of these countries reacted against the MAI draft can be found in the words
of Manmohan Singh, the former Finance Minister of India : “You have to remember our
history as a colony. The East India Company came here as a trader and ended up owning
the country.” (The Economist, 1998).
11It also appears that the same countries that object MAI recently negotiated new BITs.
An example is India (see The Economist, 1998).
7The puzzle is obvious. Most countries, including LDCs, are likely to bene…t
from investment liberalization. Even when LDCs estimate losses from entering
an agreement on investment liberalization, they are free to opt out. Neverthe-
less, we observe countries (some LDCs especially) that are against the prospect
of MAI, even when they do not consider to enter. What they do object is the
eventuality that other countries form a club with liberal rules on investment.
In the following sections we present a model in which the choice of MAI mem-
bership for the single country involves the basic trade-o¤ identi…ed in Markusen
(1998) and the puzzle mentioned above …nds a possible explanation.
3 The Model
3.1 The World Economy
We assume a world with many countries. For simplicity, we index countries by
h on a continuum of unit measure. In the world, there is also a unit continuum
of goods, indexed by i. Labor is the only production factor, and each country
has the same endowment L. Labor is perfectly mobile across sectors or …rms,
and perfectly immobile across countries. Consumers are identical everywhere.





where C (i) is consumption of good i. All goods are freely tradable, so, their
price is equalized worldwide.
Production technologies are identical across sectors and countries. Each
good can be produced either out of a CRS technology by competitive …rms, or
with an IRS technology by a monopolist.12 Moreover, monopolistic …rms can
exploit their knowledge capital internationally by choosing the location of their
operations. Consequently, we call these …rms MNEs, henceforth.
3.2 MNEs
There is a one-to-one correspondence between sectors and MNEs. So, in the
world there is a unit mass of MNEs, and the distribution of their ”headquarters”
across the world is exogenous and …xed. The share of MNEs having their home
country in country h is denoted by ¹h. MNEs repatriate all their pro…ts to the
home country.
Each MNE operates from a single plant, and is required to make a plant-
level, cost reducing, investment I before starting production. Plants have a
…xed size.13 We assume that in each plant one unit of labor is turned into
12This set up is analogous to that used in Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989).
13The assumption that …rms’ size is given can be justi…ed, for instance, on the ground of
monitoring and coordination costs (see, e.g., Holmstrom and Tirole (1989)).
81=c(I) units of whichever manufacture i. The higher the investment I,t h e
lower is c(I). Hence, the higher is the e¢ciency of the plant in transforming
inputs into outputs. Investment expenditures consists of Á(I) units of labor.
Consider a MNE that has decided to locate its production facility for good i
in country h (possibly its own home country). It has to solve a two-stage game.
In the …rst stage, the MNE chooses how much to invest in order to reduce its
unit production costs; in the second stage, the price for its good is set.
As for the second stage, recall that each MNE can produce and sell a given
good i at a world-wide level using its IRS technology (trade is free). However,
the same good can also be supplied by competitive …rms belonging to any coun-
try using a CRS technology. We restrict the analysis to cases in which the labor
supply L is su¢ciently big to ensure that world demand of any good i is partly
satis…ed by the competitive fringe (recall that the employment size of MNEs
is …xed). By choice of units, we assume that one unit of each good i is pro-
duced by competitive …rms using one unit of labor in all locations. This implies
that wages must be equalized across countries. Using labor as the numeraire,
each manufacture i will be supplied by competitive …rms at a unit-price. From
the assumption of Cobb-Douglas preferences, monopolistic MNEs would like to
charge an in…nite mark-up over marginal costs in all markets. Hence, the only
solution to the second stage of the MNE problem is the limit-pricing one: MNEs
will …x a price equal to unity.
Turning to the …rst stage, the MNE sets its investment by equating marginal
costs and marginal returns of investment. The costs are due to plant-level
…xed labor expenditures. Once the investment is made, plant-level …xed costs
are sunk. So, the investment “ties” the MNE to country h. The bene…ts of
the investment are due to increased e¢ciency in production that results into a
higher mark-up. The returns of investment are not fully appropriated by the
MNE. Countries are able to appropriate part of the rents of MNEs. We assume
that, because of unforeseeable contingencies, negotiations between MNEs and
countries’ representatives concerning rent division can only occur ex-post, once
investment costs are sunk (incomplete contracting).14 Thus, in deciding about
the investment, the MNE knows that country h will extract a fraction ¯h of its
operating pro…ts. This fraction represents the bargaining power of country h;
and bargaining power di¤ers across countries. We think of this rent extraction
in a broad sense. Obviously, it can simply be interpreted as a tax on pro…t
repatriation, but it can also include more indirect measures of rent sharing like
performance requirements or other regulatory restrictions. 15
Since perfect symmetry holds across sectors, we can omit index i and express





14See also Schnitzer (1999) for a formalization of the hold-up problem faced by MNEs
vis-à-vis host countries.
15Alternatively, in a broader framework, it can be thought as a share of MNE rents accruing
to local factors when property rights are not fully enforced (see, e.g. Markusen (1998a)).
9The lower the marginal cost in terms of labor units, the higher labor produc-
tivity and the output that …rms can obtain (1=c(I)). As for c(I) and Á(I),w e
assume, consistently, that c0 < 0, c(0) = 1; and lim
I!1
c =0 ; and that Á
0 > 0
and Á(0) = 0. Moreover, in order to have a well behaved maximum problem we
further assume that Á
00 > 0. For concreteness, we use the following functional
forms that satisfy the above requirements: c(I)=1 =(1 + I), Á(I)=( 1 =2)I2:
Solving the MNE problem it is derived that I =( 1 ¡¯h). Notice that this
solution is suboptimal: the MNE underinvests due to a hold-up problem. If the
parties were able to contract ex-ante, the optimal investment would amount to
I =1 ; and they could reach a Pareto-superior solution. However, due to con-
tract incompleteness, investment and total rents are suboptimal. Note …nally
that MNEs’ pro…ts can di¤er across countries only because of di¤erences in bar-
gaining power ¯h. Moreover, this result will hold also allowing for any possible
cross-country asymmetry resulting in productivity di¤erences. The di¤erential
in productivity would be compensated by an equal di¤erence in wages.16
3.3 Modeling MAI
Countries di¤er in their bargaining power with respect to MNEs. Though, it is
not a-priori obvious which countries may be “high-beta” and which countries
may be “low-beta” countries. Quite often, the actual (economic, …scal, legal,
administrative) costs of doing business in a country are only known ex-post,
once negotiations with local authorities are dealt or establishments are set.17
Hence, we assume in the following analysis that ¯h is revealed to MNEs only
after their commitment to invest in country h.M N E s ,h o w e v e r ,k n o w e x - a n t e
how ¯h is distributed across countries. For simplicity, we will assume a uniform
distribution of bargaining power on the range [¯l;¯u].
The MAI imposes a cost on joining countries. If a country decides to enter
MAI, it has to accept a limitation of its own policy discretion vis-à-vis MNEs.
W em o d e lt h i sl o s so fd i s c r e t i o na sar e d u c t i o ni nc o u n t r i e s ’b a r g a i n i n gp o w e r .
The reduction is assumed to be of size °, so that, if country h enters MAI,
its bargaining power falls to ¯h ¡ °.18 We assume the reduction of bargaining
power ° to be exogenously given. In the subsequent analysis the term ° will be
referred to as the “strictness” of MAI. The higher is °, the higher is the foregone
share of FDI rents extracted by countries.
We can now describe the whole game. In the …rst stage, countries choose
whether or not to participate in MAI and announce it to MNEs. In a second
stage, …rms choose in which country to locate without knowledge of ¯h, but with
16So, as will be clear, the results that follow would hold also allowing for ex-ante cross-
country asymmetries.
17Anecdotal evidence on MNEs that shut down operations in foreign countries or that regret
about their FDI decisions is quite abundant.
18The assumption of a …xed loss of bargaining power matters for our results. Of course, in
reality high-beta countries might be those that have to accept larger concessions. However,
as long as the reduction in bargaining power is less than proportional for high-beta countries,
our results hold qualitatively unchanged.
10knowledge of its distribution function. At this stage, …rms have therefore only
to choose whether to invest in a country that belongs to MAI or in a country
that does not belong to it. MNEs may also randomize their choice, attributing
a probability p to MAI members and a probability (1 ¡ p) to countries that are
not members. Since MNEs are ex-ante identical, this choice will be the same
for all …rms. In the third stage, the bargaining power of countries is revealed to
MNEs, and investments are chosen. Finally, goods’ prices are chosen.
T h r e er e m a r k sa r ei no r d e r .F i r s t ,w er e s t r i c tt h ea n a l y s i st oc a s e si nw h i c h
the mass of labor in each country, L; is big enough not to be completely used up
by MNEs located there. Second, note that the sequence of the …rst two stages
is immaterial. Since countries are atomistic, they will not take into account the
e¤ects of their own actions on the behavior of MNEs. The solution is therefore
as if countries and …rms are acting together. Third, it is to be noted that in
the present set-up countries will not be willing to signal their own bargaining
power (for instance, through the use of subsidies) to MNEs.19 The reason is
that a separating equilibrium cannot be realized. The intuition runs as follows.
Subsidy competition when ¯h is known leads to a full transfer of FDI rents
to MNEs. Countries with low bargaining power are bound to use subsidies of
lower magnitude, if they want to break even. However, when ¯h is unknown,
countries with high bargaining power will surely mimic “low-beta” countries,
using low subsidies.20
The objective of MNEs in the …rst stage is to choose the location of their
plant (in a MAI or in a non-MAI country) that maximizes expected pro…ts.
Pro…ts at this stage can only be de…ned in expected value because the bargaining
power of the particular country chosen is still unknown. After having solved for
the equilibrium in the last two stages of the game, the pro…ts ¼h of a MNE
choosing to produce in country h belonging or not belonging to MAI are as
follows
¼h =0 :5(1¡ ¯h)
2 ; (3)
¼h =0 :5(1¡ ¯h + °)
2 : (4)
Firms’ pro…ts decrease with ¯h for two reasons. The higher is countries’
bargaining power, the lower is the share of FDI pro…ts repatriated by MNEs,
and the lower is the amount of investment undertaken. This explains why any
increase in ¯h produces a more than proportional reduction in ¼h.A tg i v e n¯h,
the participation in MAI is bene…cial for MNEs because of the same reasons:
larger repatriation of FDI pro…ts and more abundant investment. Firms observe
ex-ante MAI membership of all countries and know the distribution of ¯h across
19Bond and Samuelson (1986) …nd an opposite result. In that paper, …rms are not informed
about a productivity parameter characterizing countries. Countries with high productivity can
then signal through subsidies and tax-holidays their superior business environment without
fear of being jeopardized by low-productivity countries: a separating equilibrium exists.
20Note also that the only pooling equilibrium is with zero subsidies. The reason is trivial:
with positive subsidies countries will only transfer resources to MNEs without a¤ecting the
probability of receiving FDIs.
11countries. However, they are not able to associate country h with a value
of ¯h. Hence, …rms can only form expectations on the pro…ts that can be
realized in countries belonging to MAI and in those that are outside of MAI. In
t h ef o l l o w i n g ,w ed e n o t e ,r e s p e c t i v e l y ,b yZ and ¡Z the set of MAI and non-
MAI countries. The location decision of each MNE is therefore based on the
comparison between EZ¼ ´ E [¼hjh 2 Z] and E¡Z¼ ´ E[¼hjh 2¡ Z],w h e r e
E [:j:] denotes the conditional expectations operator. One observes from (3)
and (4) that locating in non-MAI countries could be preferable for …rms only
if the countries that belong to MAI have, on average, higher bargaining power.
Only in this case we can have MNEs choosing p =0 . In case of indi¤erence,
EZ¼ = E¡Z¼, p m a yh a v ea n yv a l u eb e t w e e n0a n d1 .
As for countries, they choose to participate in MAI only if this leads to
higher expected income.21 The choice of entering MAI matters for countries’
expected income because this directly a¤ects countries bargaining power, their
ability to extract FDIs’ rents, and the amount of investment undertaken by
multinationals. Participation in MAI a¤ects also countries’ expected income
indirectly, by shaping the expected FDI in‡ows. This occurs for two reasons.
First, because MNEs attach di¤erent probabilities to the alternative of invest-
ing in MAI or in non-MAI countries. Second, because the mass of countries
belonging to MAI may di¤er from that remaining outside of MAI. Denoting by
z, z 2 [0;1]; the fraction of countries joining MAI, the expected FDI in‡ows
of an arbitrary country h if, respectively, participating and not participating in
MAI are given by p=z and (1 ¡p)=(1 ¡ z).E x p e c t e d i n c o m e o f c o u n t r y h in
the two alternatives are easily obtained:




(¯h ¡°)(1¡ ¯h +°)+¹h¦(p;z); (5)





¯h (1 ¡ ¯h)+¹h¦(p; z); (6)
where ¦(z) are the expected pro…ts of a representative MNE, which in turn
depend upon the values of p and z. The …rst term in (5) and (6) is labor
income, the second term is the expected rent-extraction from MNEs locating
in country h, and the last term are the aggregate expected pro…ts repatriated
from MNEs to country h. Note that since each country is atomistic, its decision
about whether to enter MAI or not does not alter the last term in the sum
of (5) and (6), i.e., expected repatriated pro…ts are not a¤ected. Note also
that countries have no incentive to exert a bargaining power larger than a half.
Above a half the loss of income from reduced investments weighs out the gains
from an increased share of pro…ts. Consistently, since countries are not obliged
to exercise their bargaining power when this is unpro…table to them, we can
21Note that, given symmetric preferences and pricing, countries’ income is also a utilitarian
measure of countries’ welfare.
12…x henceforth ¯u =0 :5:22 From this follows that, at given z and p, the stricter
is MAI (i.e., the higher is °), the lower is countries’ rent extraction.Ah i g h e r
° not only reduces the share of rents appropriated by host countries but also
raises investments undertaken by MNEs. However, since ¯h ¡°<0:5, the …rst
e¤ect always prevails, and the term (¯h ¡ °)(1¡¯h +°) necessarily falls with
°:
4 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we analyze the location of …rms and the choice of countries about
their participation to MAI that emerge at equilibrium. MNEs are identical,
and each is faced with the same problem. Their behavior is summarized by
a probability p of locating MNEs in MAI countries. Countries instead di¤er
among themselves, and may solve their problem di¤erently. The strategy of a
given country h is an element in fZ;¡Zg. Countries’ behavior is summarized
by the fraction z of countries that decide to join the set Z of MAI members.
A Nash equilibrium of this game is de…ned by a pair of values (p;z), p 2 [0;1]
and z 2 [0;1], such that no …rm is willing to revise the probability of locating
into MAI countries, and no country is willing to enter or exit MAI.
Consider …rst a sub-class of cases in which all countries can potentially agree
on MAI, i.e., where °<¯ l. It is easy to ascertain (by inspection of (5) and (6))
that any candidate equilibrium enters one of the following characterizations:
i) “Full MAI”, p =1 , z =1 , which occurs if and only if EZ¼>E ¡Z¼ and
EZyh >E ¡Zyh for all h;
ii) “No MAI”, p =0 , z =0 , which occurs if and only if EZ¼<E ¡Z¼ and
EZyh <E ¡Zyh for all h;
iii) “Partial MAI”, p 2 (0;1), z 2 (0;1), which occurs if and only if EZ¼ =
E¡Z¼, EZyh >E ¡Zyh for some h and EZyh <E ¡Zyh for some other h.
To solve our game it is necessary to have a better description of the countries
that are most keen to join MAI. The following Lemma allows a characterization
of the countries that decide to be MAI members when the candidate equilibrium
exhibits a partial MAI.
Lemma 1 If there exists ¯ such that EZyh = E¡Zyh for one h,t h e n : i )
EZyh >E ¡Zyh for all h such that ¯h > ¯; ii) EZyh <E ¡Zyh for all h
such that ¯h < ¯.
Proof: See Appendix 1.
The intuition of the above Lemma is straightforward. Countries with high
bargaining power su¤er less in relative terms from MAI membership compared
22As will be clear in the following analysis, what matters for our results is that ¯h · 0:5
for all h,w h e r e a st h ec h o i c e¯u =0 :5 only serves the scope of simplifying notations and the
characterization of equilibrium.
13to countries with low bargaining power. Since the loss of bargaining power asso-
ciated with participation in MAI is …xed at °; the percentage loss of bargaining
power from MAI is lower for “high-beta” countries. This explains why those
countries that are most willing to participate in MAI are characterized by high
bargaining power. This result has important implications. At given ¯h; MNEs
always prefer to invest in a country that belongs to MAI. This is due to ”in-
creased discipline” associated with MAI: any country reduces by assumption its
rent extraction rate, if it becomes MAI member. However, ¯h is revealed to
… r m so n l ye x - p o s t ,s ot h a tt h el o c a t i o nd e c i s i o ni sd e t e r m i n e do nt h eb a s i so f
the comparison of conditional expected pro…ts in MAI and non-MAI countries.
Since countries participating in MAI tend to be characterized by high bargaining
power, the decision to invest in MAI is also shaped by the extent of the adverse
selection, that tends to reduce expected MNE pro…ts in MAI and gives a reason
for a possible preference for locating FDIs in non-MAI countries.23 Note also
that the extent of the adverse selection is higher when MAI is small,b e c a u s ei n
this case only countries with very high bargaining power are in MAI.
Lemma 1 permits a simple characterization of z as a function of ¯.F r o m





Whenever ¯ · ¯l the candidate equilibrium is necessarily a full MAI, whereas,
if ¯ ¸ 0:5 we can only have no MAI at equilibrium, …nally, when ¯l < ¯<0:5
we have a value of z consistent with a partial MAI equilibrium.
Next, we proceed by characterizing the conditional expected pro…ts of MNEs
with respect to the bargaining power of the indi¤erent country ¯. MNEs form
expectations on the pro…ts they may earn in a given country h using the infor-
mation revealed by its decision on whether to enter MAI or not. Using Lemma
1, conditional expected pro…ts in a MAI and in a non-MAI country, respectively,














Denote by ¢E the di¤erence EZ¼ ¡ E¡Z¼ and by ¯
¤ the value of ¯ that
satis…es the equality ¢E =0 . The behavior of MNEs’ expected pro…ts is
summarized in the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 i) ¯
¤ exists in (¯l;0:5) and is unique if °l <°<° u; with °l and °u
monotonically decreasing functions of the parameter ¯l;i i )¯
¤ is monotonically
23Adverse selection comes from the assumption of a …xed loss in bargaining power, which
guarantees that the proportional loss from MAI membership is higher for low-beta countries. If
the loss were proportionally higher for high-beta countries, the only possible equilibrium would
trivially be with MNEs always investing only in MAI countries, and full MAI membership by
all countries.
14increasing with °; (iii) consider ¯ =0 :5,t h e n¢E>0 if and only if °<° u;
(iv) consider ¯ = ¯l,t h e n¢E<0 if and only if °>° l.
Proof: See Appendix 2.
Result i) in Lemma 2 states that an equilibrium with partial MAI is feasible
only for intermediate values of °.W h e n ° is su¢ciently small, ¢E is surely
negative, because ¯
¤ <¯ l. The adverse selection e¤ect of MAI prevails in
this case. Conversely, when ° is su¢ciently high, then ¯
¤ > 1=2 and ¢E is
necessarily positive. The discipline e¤ect prevails. For intermediate values of °
the two e¤ects may o¤set each other, and an indi¤erence solution for countries
may emerge, together with a partial MAI equilibrium. We also see from result ii)
t h a tt h es i z eo fM A Ia tw h i c he x p e c t e dM N E si na n do u t s i d eM A Ia r ee q u a l i z e d
is decreasing with °. This means that the size z of a partial MAI is necessarily
decreasing with °.F i n a l l y ,r e s u l t siii)a n div) are crucial in checking for pure
strategy equilibria.
A di¤erent question is that of the characterization and uniqueness of partial
MAI equilibria. We see from (7) that, given ¯
¤; t h e r ei so n l yo n ev a l u eo fz in
(0,1). It is proven also that there exists only one value of p that sustains an
equilibrium with z 2 (0;1).
Lemma 3 i) There exists a unique value of p 2 (0;1) that sustains a partition





p =1 ;i v )p>z .
Proof: See Appendix 3
We remark on result iv) in Lemma 3. The fact that p>zin any partial
MAI equilibrium means that by joining MAI, countries are able to attract more
FDIs. The mere fact that a country belongs to MAI reduces its bargaining
power, rent extraction, and income. To induce some countries to be in MAI,
there must be higher expected FDI in‡ows for the countries in MAI, in order
to compensate for the loss in bargaining power. As will be clear in the next
section, this has important welfare implications.
Lemmas 1 to 3 are su¢cient to give a full characterization of the equilib-
rium, when all countries can potentially enter MAI. In the next Proposition, we
characterize which types of equilibria emerge with respect to the strictness of
MAI (°):
Proposition 4 Consider °<¯ l. Then: i) if °<° l the only equilibrium is
“no MAI”; ii) if °>° u the only equilibrium is “full MAI”; iii) if °l <°<° u
the equilibrium may either be “no MAI”, “partial MAI”, or “full MAI”.
Proof: See Appendix 4.
We can consider now all cases where °>¯ l. Clearly, all countries with
¯h <°will not enter MAI, since they will not be able to extract any rent from
15MNEs. We have then to replace the notion of full MAI equilibrium with that
of “residual MAI” equilibrium, namely, a con…guration where p =1and where
all countries with ¯h >°are willing to enter MAI. By arguments analogous
to those used for the cases where °<¯ l we can characterize equilibrium with
respect to ° in the following Proposition.
Proposition 5 Consider °>¯ l.T h e n ,t h e r e e x i s t s °L, °l <° L <° u,s u c h
that: i) if °<° L the only equilibrium is “no MAI”; ii) if °>° u the only
equilibrium is “residual MAI”; iii) if °L <°<° u the equilibrium may either
be “no MAI”, “partial MAI”, or “residual MAI”.
Proof: See Appendix 5.
R e s u l t si nP r o p o s i t i o n s4a n d5c a nb es u m m a r i z e dw i t ht h eh e l po fF i g u r e
1. In general, we observe that the size of MAI rises and then falls as it becomes
stricter. For su¢ciently low values of ° t h ed i s c i p l i n ee ¤ e c to fM A Ii sn o t
strong enough to o¤set the adverse selection e¤ect, and this explains why the
only equilibrium tends to be the no MAI equilibrium. In this case, FDIs would
be directed only to non-MAI countries, and no country would choose to enter
the agreement.
Insert …gure 1 about here
As ° rises, the emergence of partial MAI becomes possible. The adverse
selection e¤ect can be o¤set by the discipline e¤ect. In this case, coordination
problems are very strong. The extent of adverse selection depends upon the
size of MAI. A large MAI has small adverse selection problems, and can be
self-sustaining even if the discipline e¤ect is not too big. Conversely, a small
MAI will strongly su¤er from adverse selection, and could end up being unsus-
tainable even with a rather high discipline gain. This explains the coexistence
of equilibria with no MAI and with full (or residual) MAI when ° has interme-
diate values. Note also that in this region the size of partial MAI shrinks as
° rises, because, by Lemma 2, the threshold value ¯
¤ rises. A further growth
in the value of ° leaves full or residual MAI as the only possible equilibrium
con…gurations; the discipline e¤ect is prevailing. As ° rises further, though, the
size of MAI inevitably shrinks: the countries with the lowest bargaining power
will drop out, because MAI is becoming too strict for them. Note also that, at
given °, the size of MAI tends to rise with ¯l. As the average bargaining power
of countries rises, it will be easier to realize a successful MAI. By the argument
presented in Lemma 1, few countries will choose to stay outside of MAI at a
given °.
165W e l f a r e
In this section, we establish the welfare properties of the possible equilibrium
con…gurations. We will limit the analysis to cases where °<¯ l,s ot h a ta l l
countries are potential MAI members. We will ask in particular two questions.
How does world-wide welfare change across the di¤erent possible con…gurations?
Which countries are going to be better-o¤ in a world with MAI compared to a
situation where MAI is not in place?
By the choice of Cobb-Douglas preferences, and since all prices are 1, coun-
t r i e s ’w e l f a r ei sj u s tm e a s u r e db yt h e i ro w ne x p e c t e di n c o m e ,a n dt h eu t i l i t a r i a n
world welfare indicator corresponds to aggregate countries’ income. The world



















2) and 0:5(1 ¡ ¯
2
h) are the sum of country h rents and
hosted MNEs’ pro…ts when country h is, respectively, in and outside MAI. It is
easy to see that, whenever at equilibrium z<1, world welfare can be improved








(0:5 ¡ ¯l)[2(0:5 ¡ (0:5 ¡¯l)z)+¯l]
6
> 0
The intuition is simple. Countries, when deciding upon entering MAI, just
compare expected rent extraction from FDIs in the two alternatives. However,
when participating into MAI, countries also boost the pro…ts of hosted MNEs.
Since this latter e¤ect is neglected by countries, the size of MAI emerging at
equilibrium is always suboptimal, except for the full MAI equilibrium.
The implementation of MAI improves world welfare as compared with a
situation where MAI is not in place. The comparison between world welfare




°[1 +2(¯l ¡°)] > 0; (11)
while the welfare comparisons with the case of partial MAI are more involved.24
Does this mean that all countries are always going to gain individually from
MAI membership? Let’s start by comparing the income of a generic country h
24Unreported simulations show that, in all cases, full MAI is preferable to partial MAI which
is in turn superior to no MAI. So, equilibria are welfare rankable.
17in a world with full MAI with that it would achieve without MAI. One checks
that country h gains from MAI provided the following condition is met
¹h >
°(1 ¡2¯h +°)
¦FM ¡ ¦NM =
4(1 ¡ 2¯h +°)
3 ¡ 2(¯l ¡ °)
´ ¹FM
h : (12)
Observe …rst that ¹FM
h is always positive: countries can gain from MAI imple-
mentation only if they hold MNEs. Second, note that the cut-o¤ value ¹FM
h
falls with the bargaining power of country h and rises with °.25 This is because
the percentage loss of bargaining power from MAI participation is lower for
high-beta countries and because the impact on rent extraction associated with
higher ° outweighs that on pro…t repatriation. Hence, in a full MAI equilibrium
(that is realized by Proposition 5 for relatively high values of °) those countries
t h a ta r eb e t t e ro ¤c o m p a r e dw i t haw o r l dw i t hn oM A Im u s th o l das u ¢ c i e n t
amount of MNE shares and are more likely characterized by a high bargaining
power.
W ec o m p a r en o wt h ew e l f a r eo fc o u n t r i e si naw o r l dw i t hn oM A Ia n di no n e








¦PM ¡ ¦NM ´ ¹
PM¡Z
h : (13)
Again, since p>zby Lemma 3, we see that countries need to hold some MNEs
to gain from MAI implementation. Compared with full MAI, however, ¹
PM¡Z
h
rises with ¯h. Now, in fact, we consider a country that does not belong to MAI.
So, it is not losing bargaining power after the implementation of MAI. What
happens instead is a loss of FDI ‡ows due to the fact that h now is an outsider.
So, the loss of rent extraction associated with the loss of FDIs is higher the
higher its bargaining power.
W h e n ,i n s t e a d ,c o u n t r yh decides to join a partial MAI, it will gain compared




z(¯h ¡ °)(1 ¡¯h + °)
¦PM ¡ ¦NM ´ ¹
PM Z
h : (14)
From (14) it can be seen that a country might gain from MAI implementation
even if it is not home of MNEs. In fact, as shown in Appendix 6, the threshold
value ¹
PMZ
h may in this case be negative. There are two con‡icting forces that
s h a p et h ev a l u eo f¹
PMZ
h : these can be seen in the numerator of its expression.
On the one hand, the participation in MAI reduces the bargaining power of
country h,s ot h a t ,a sf o r¹FM
h , we need a country holding a larger share of
MNEs the larger is ° t og a i nf r o maw o r l dw i t hM A I .H o w e v e r ,s i n c ep>z ,






18by joining MAI a country will bene…t compared with a world with no MAI just
because of more abundant FDI in‡ows. We summarize the results of this section
in the following Proposition.
Proposition 6 i) Except for the case of “full MAI”, the size of MAI emerging
at equilibrium is always suboptimal; ii) When MAI is “full”, single countries
can gain from the implementation of MAI only if endowed with MNE shares;
iii) When MAI is “partial”, single countries have to hold MNEs to gain as out-
sider, while they can gain also without MNEs as insiders.
The main message is that MAI rises world welfare without necessarily lead-
ing to a Pareto improvement. The implementation of MAI has three main
e¤ects: an e¢ciency e¤ect, associated with a reduction in the hold-up problem,
a redistributive e¤ect, with a net average gain of MNEs vis-à-vis host countries,
and a FDI-redirection e¤ect, with MAI members receiving more inward invest-
ments. Countries that cannot bene…t from repatriated MNE pro…ts or bigger
FDI in‡ows could end up being net losers after the implementation of MAI. In
general, multilateral investment agreements produce externalities through the
FDI-redirection e¤ect. MAI losers may be willing to join MAI in any case:
opting out will undermine FDI in‡ows. When a partial MAI is realized, those
countries that opt out su¤er from a reduction in FDI in‡ows; this loss can be
compensated only by su¢cient MNEs’ holdings. Conversely, the countries that
participate in a partial MAI can gain from larger FDI in‡ows even without
MNEs’ holdings.
6D i s c u s s i o n
We have shown in the previous sections that the implementation of MAI is
subject to coordination failures, and that in spite of the worldwide e¢ciency
gain, Pareto improvements are not guaranteed with MAI. Some country might
gain a lot, some other might lose. Coordination failures arise from the presence
of an externality associated with the FDI-redirection e¤ect of MAI. The fact
that some countries agree to self-restrain from exerting bargaining power vis-
à-vis MNEs tends to divert FDIs from other countries. This a¤ects then the
willingness of each country to enter MAI. The emergence of possible MAI losers
comes from the unequal distribution of knowledge capital, and then MNEs,
across the world. Some countries are the home of many giant multinational
corporations, other countries instead are lacking knowledge capital and MNE
holdings.
We have discussed our results in terms of two key parameters: the degree
of MAI strictness, °, and the distribution of countries bargaining power, as
expressed by ¯l. The implementation of MAI requires a su¢ciently “severe”
agreement: the loss of countries’ bargaining power ° must be high enough.
This is necessary to o¤set the adverse selection problem that arises with the
implementation of MAI. Those countries that are more likely to trade o¤ their
19bargaining power for greater FDI in‡ows are those with high ¯h.M N E st h e n
rationally expect the “MAI club” to be formed by countries that are, on average,
more “greedy” than others. Doing business there would be pro…table only if
MAI members commit to self-restrain their bargaining power vis-à-vis MNEs
su¢ciently. We also see that the realization of MAI would be facilitated when
¯l is high, namely, in a world where, on average, the balance of power is in favor
of countries, and not of MNEs. The leverage of a MAI agreement in attracting
FDIs will be higher under this scenario. At intermediate levels of ° and ¯l the
extent of coordination failures is particularly acute. There, results depend a
lot on expectations and “political climate”. If there is widespread presumption
that a MAI agreement will be implemented, this expectation will be ful…lled; if
expectations are pessimistic, no agreement will be reached.
We did not discuss so far the determination of °, namely the strictness of
MAI. Parameter ° in the analysis has been taken as exogenous. This corre-
sponds to a situation where the design of the investment agreement is decided
independently by a third party, for instance, an international agency, and pro-
posed to countries, that independently may decide to participate or not. We
know that high ° is needed for the realization of MAI. Hence, if an international
agency can independently and optimally choose °,i tw i l lc h o o s ear a t h e r“ s e -
vere” agreement. However, in many real world instances the determination of
° requires the consensus of countries, for instance through a voting procedure.
If this is the case, the implementation of MAI may be hard to achieve without
some form of side-payments to MAI losers (obtainable, for instance, by linking
the negotiations of MAI with those on some other issue).26 The reason is that
some countries might anticipate that they will lose from the implementation of
MAI, and will consequently oppose a strict MAI (high °). In the absence of
side payments, the realization of an agreement on FDIs will be easy only in a
world where the distribution of MNEs is relatively equal across countries. How-
ever, in the light of the results in Proposition 5, we see that things are di¤erent
in the case of bilateral or regional investments treaties. When the agreement
is ex-ante restricted to a subset of countries, we can expect a relatively easy
implementation of preferential investment agreements. Also the countries with
few or no MNEs’ holdings might anticipate to gain from the agreement because
of more abundant FDIs in‡ows.27 This might explain why we have observed
in recent times a strong opposition of some countries to the implementation
of a world-wide MAI together with the proliferation of bilateral and regional
agreements on international investment.
26See also Hoekman and Saggi (1999) for arguments in favor to linking multilateral invest-
ment agreements with negotiations on other issues in a ”grand bargain”.
27Bilateral investment treaties between developed and developing countries are indeed quite
common. Morevoer, as in the case of Nafta, regional investment agreements may involve
countries at di¤erent stages of development.
207C o n c l u s i o n
We have developed a model that gives a rational to both the desirability of
MAI and the observed problems in its implementation. We have shown that the
externalities arising from the FDI-redirection e¤ects of MAI might explain the
failure to implement MAI and the emergency of coordination failures that give
rise to multiple equilibria. We have also shown that after the implementation of
MAI some countries (either MAI members or outsiders) could lose. This might
explain why we have recently seen some countries strongly opposing the mere
proposal of MAI.
Our model is highly stylized. However, the main message is likely to remain
unchanged in a framework where MNEs decide upon their locations taking into
account countries’ market size, factor prices, or trade barriers. We expect in-
stead that a more sophisticated representation of the process of MAI implemen-
tation may a¤ect our conclusions. Future work should check the robustness of
our results when, for instance, MNEs are engaged in active lobbying, or when
countries weigh di¤erently the welfare of di¤erent agents when deciding about
MAI membership.
21A Appendix
A.1 Appendix 1. Proof of Lemma 1.
























Next, from the partial derivatives of expected countries’ income with respect to




































(1 ¡ 2¯h +2 °); (18)
where (15) has been used in (16) and (17). Inequality (18) is clearly satis…ed,
since
_
¯<0:5 and ¯h < 0:5 for all h. The result of Lemma 1 follows directly
from (15) and (18). ¤
A.2 Appendix 2: Proof of Lemma 2.
Using (8) and developing integrals the di¤erence ¢E = EZ¼ ¡ E¡Z¼ can be
evaluated as follows:
¢E =
¡5+1 8 ° +1 2 °2 +
_







¯ · 0:5. It is easily checked that the value ¯
¤ that equates to zero





5 ¡ 18° ¡ 12°2 ¡12¯l +4 ¯
2
l
1 ¡ 6° ¡ 2¯l
: (20)
One can see from (20) that ¯
¤ as a function of ° has an asymptote in ° =
0:5¡¯l







(1¡6°¡2¯l)2 ¸ 0 in the admissible
range of ¯l and °,s ot h a tlim¯
¤
°!°¤¡
=+ 1; and lim¯
¤
°!°¤+
= ¡1. Since, when ° =0 ,
¯
¤ is always higher than 1=2, we necessarily have that ¯
¤ > 1=2 for °<° ¤.







always larger than 7/4. Hence, there must exist °l and °u, 0 <° ¤ <° l <° u <
1=2, such that ¯l <¯
¤ < 0:5 if and only if °l <°<° u.T h ev a l u e so f°l and











































¯ =0 :5: In this case, ¢E =0i¤. ° = °u. Thus, by
( 2 3 ) ,i tm u s tb et h a t¢E>0 if and only if °<° u. Likewise, consider
_
¯ = ¯l:
Then, ¢E =0i¤. ° = °l. Thus, by (23), it must be that ¢E<0 if and only
if °>° l. The above …ndings are summarized in Lemma 2. ¤
A.3 Appendix 3. Proof of Lemma 3.
Since EZyh = E¡Zyh for the country with bargaining power ¯













¤)) = 0: (24)
Solving (24) for p we obtain
p =
z¯





¤ (1 ¡ ¯
¤)
: (25)
It is directly seen from (25) that p is in the range (0;1) for any z in (0;1) and
that lim
z!0p =0and lim
z!1p =1 : It can also be checked that since ¯
¤ < 1=2,t h e n
p>z . Finally, we can show that p is monotonically rising with z.T od ot h a t ,
we need to recall that ¯
¤ =0 :5 ¡ z (0:5 ¡¯l) (this comes from (7)):> From
total di¤erentiation of p with respect to z we have
@p
@z = pz + p¯¤¯
¤
z.P a r t i a l










¤ (1 ¡ ¯
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¤ (1 ¡ ¯
¤)]
2 < 0; (27)
¯
¤
z = ¡(0:5 ¡ ¯l) < 0; (28)
23which yield an unambiguously negative sign for
@p
@z: Summing up results, we
have Lemma 3. ¤
A.4 Appendix 4. Proof of Proposition 4.
By de…nition, the pure strategy equilibrium no MAI requires p =0and z =0 ,
so that in this case ¯
¤ =0 :5: This collection of strategies is a Nash equilibrium
if and only if i) EZ¼<E ¡Z¼ and ii) EZyh <E ¡Zyh for all h. By Lemma 2,
requirement i) is satis…ed if and only if °>° l,w h i l eii) is necessarily true for
p =0( t h i si sc h e c k e db yi n s p e c t i o no f( 5 )a n d( 6 ) ) .
The pure strategy equilibrium full MAI requires p =1and z =1 ; so that
in this case ¯
¤ = ¯l. This collection of strategies is a Nash equilibrium if and
only if iii) EZ¼>E ¡Z¼ and iv) EZyh >E ¡Zyh for all h. By Lemma 2, iii)i s
satis…ed if and only if °<° u; while iv) is necessarily true for p =1(check (5)
and (6)).
The mixed strategy equilibrium partial MAI exists if, at p 2 (0;1) and
z 2 (0;1), v) EZ¼ = E¡Z¼ and vi) EZyh = E¡Zyh for one h.B yL e m m a2 ,v)
is satis…ed if and only if °l <°<° u,w h i l e ,vi) is true by Lemma 3 . Results
a r es u m m a r i z e di nP r o p o s i t i o n4 .¤
A.5 Appendix 5. Proof of Proposition 5.
When ¯l <°it must be checked whether ¯
¤, as given by (20), is still higher
than °: If this is not the case, then in the expression for ¢E in (19) ¯ must
be replaced by °. It is straightforward to show that ¯
¤ <°if and only if









At ° = °L we have that ¯
¤ = °. Moreover, one checks that °u >° L and that





¤ >° ;i.e., °= 2 (°¤;°L). Note that in this case Lemma 3
holds unchanged. An equilibrium with partial MAI requires °<¯
¤ < 1=2 which
corresponds to °L <°<° u by the above argument and Lemma 2. By the same
argument as in the proof of Proposition 4, °<° u is also necessary and su¢cient
for the emergence of a no MAI equilibrium. To check for the existence of an
equilibrium with residual MAI, we have to check whether ¢E>0 when ¯ = °.
It is easy to show that a necessary and su¢cient condition for an equilibrium
with residual MAI is °>° L.
Consider then ¯
¤ <° ;i.e. ° 2 (°¤;°L): In such a case, there cannot be
a partial MAI because there is no country with ¯h >°that splits the set of
potential participants into a subset of actual participants and one of outsiders.
No MAI is surely an equilibrium, because °<° L <° u. An equilibrium with
24residual MAI is instead impossible, because, when °<° L; it occurs that ¢E<
0; when ¯ = °: ¤
A.6 Appendix 6.
We prove here that there exist parameter constellations where countries gain
from participating to a partial MAI compared with what they could get in a













°[1 + ° ¡2¯h(1 ¡ 2¯h +°)]
[(¯h ¡°)(1 ¡ ¯h + °)]
2 < 0: (31)























4(0:5¡°)(0:5+°).B ye v a l u a t i n gt h e
total derivative of
p
z with respect to ¯












2¯l +2 ¯l°2 ¡°2¢2: (33)
Since we are considering a partial MAI equilibrium, by Proposition 4 we need
°l <°<° u. The only ambiguous term in (33) is (1 ¡ 2¯l ¡ °),w h i c hi s
decreasing in °. Plugging the highest possible value for ° (i.e., °u)i n t ot h i s
term we …nd














which is always positive for ¯l < 0:5. It follows that
@(p=z)
@¯¤ j¯¤=0:5 < 0. So, one
can always choose a pair (°;¯l) such that ¯
¤ < 1=2 and some countries with ¯h
su¢ciently close to 1/2 for which p=z > ­h. ¤
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27Figure 1
MAI equilibrium configurations
(NM=No MAI; PM= Partial MAI; FM=Full MAI; RM=Residual MAI)
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